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Introduction
On June 15, 2013, ten-year-old Sarah Murnaghan underwent a
successful bilateral lung transplant.1 The fact that Sarah underwent a
lung transplant is not a unique event or an astounding breakthrough
in modern medicine or science.2 What makes Sarah’s story unique is
how she received her lung transplant. Since December 2011, Sarah
had been on the waiting list for child-donated lungs. Because she was
under twelve years old, Sarah was placed on only the pediatric list,
1.

Pennsylvania: Transplant Recipient Gets Second Set of New Lungs,
Associated Press, N.Y. Times, June 29, 2013, at A11. This was not
Sarah Murnaghan’s first lung transplant. She received a bilateral lung
transplant, a complete set of lungs rather than a single lung, from an
adult donor on June 12, 2013. This initial transplant failed almost
immediately after surgery. Id.

2.

Maryam Valapour et al., OPTN/SRTR Annual Data Report: Lung,
2012 OPTN/SRTR Ann. Data Rep. 139, at 140–41, 150 fig. 3.1. In
2012, 1,783 individuals received lung transplants, compared with fewer
than 1,000 individuals in 1998, and as of June 30, 2012, there were more
than 10,000 Americans living with a lung transplant. Id.
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meaning that she would get priority on child-donated lungs but would
be at the very bottom of the list of candidates for adult-donated
lungs.3 In May 2013, Sarah’s condition began to decline rapidly, and
she was admitted to the ICU at the Children’s Hospital of
Philadelphia. Concerned that nothing would be done in time to save
their child, the Murnaghans started a petition asking Secretary of
Health and Human Services, Kathleen Sebelius, to set aside the
under-12 rule for lung transplants.4 The petition called for the
OPTN/UNOS lung review board to make an exception for Sarah and
consider the validity of the under-12 rule as it applies to all children
seeking lung transplants.5 In late May 2013, Secretary Sebelius
consulted with the President of the OPTN (Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network) Board of Directors, Dr. John Roberts, but
as of June 5, the Secretary had not taken any formal action in Sarah’s
case.6 Due to the lack of response, Sarah’s parents filed a complaint
for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and injunctive relief in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
on June 5, 2013. The complaint sought judicial review of OPTN’s
under-12 rule for lung transplants and a TRO suspending the policy
as it applied to Sarah.7 The TRO was granted8 and Sarah was allowed
to go on the adult transplant list, where she quickly received a set
of lungs.9
Sarah has since returned home and continues to improve. But
the circumstances surrounding her lung transplant raise many legal
and ethical questions, particularly about whether a judge should be
the one to determine that the protocol is inefficient and therefore
interfere in OPTN procedures to temporarily dictate the agency’s
policy. More fundamentally, this case raises questions about who
should review and how they should review agency actions when
3.

Complaint for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary and
Permanent Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 31–32, Murnaghan v. Sebelius, 13-CV03083 (E.D. Pa. June 5, 2013).

4.

Allow Transplants of Adult Lungs to Children, Change.org, http://
www.change.org/petitions/optn-unos-change-policy-to-allow-pediatrictransplants-of-adult-lungs-based-on-medical-necessity (last visited Aug.
30, 2014).

5.

Id.

6.

Compl., supra note 3, ¶ 46.

7.

Id. ¶ 63.

8.

Order Granting Temporary Restraining Order at 1, Murnaghan v.
Sebelius, 13-CV-03083 (E.D. Pa. June 5, 2013).

9.

Change.org, supra note 4. Sarah received her new lungs quickly
because she had an extremely high LAS (lung allocation score), which
determines placement on the adult lung transplant list.
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private, non-government actors run the agency. Moreover, it raises
questions of whether non-government actors should even administer
these agencies and what must be done with time-sensitive issues such
as organ transplantation.10
This Note advocates a hybrid policy that uses judicial review for
immediate remedies to agency decisions made by private actors but
allows the agency to determine if any long-term reforms to the
protocol should be made and what the nature of those reforms should
be. Part I discusses the legal framework surrounding the creation of
OPTN as well as why the privatization of OPTN is justified. Part II
examines agency accountability through the use of judicial review and
examines the OPTN regulations using these judicial review rationales.
Lastly, using the Murnaghan case as a framework, Part III advocates
a solution to cases like that of Sarah Murnaghan, for which judicial
review of the agency determination is used along with deference to
decision making by the private, non-government agency, creating a
hybrid method for generating timely solutions that are effective for
the petitioner but also recognize that policy decisions creating longterm changes should be left to the agency.

I.

Privatization of Public Government Functions
A.

The National Organ Transplant Act

In 1984, Congress passed the National Organ and Transplant Act
(NOTA).11 The Act “called for a singular transplant network to be
operated by a non-profit organization under federal contract.”12 The
Act grants the Secretary of Health and Human Services the power to
make a grant in order to establish a qualified organ procurement
organization.13 This qualified organization must be a non-profit, must
be fiscally stable or have procedures to insure fiscal stability, and
must be certified within the four years prior to the Act “as meeting
the performance standards of a qualified organ procurement
organization.”14 This organ procurement agency is called the Organ
10.

OPTN is a government agency created under the Health Resources and
Services Administration (HRSA) but operated by the non-profit United
Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS). HRSA, About OPTN, OPTN:
Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, http://
optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/optn/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2014).

11.

National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 273–74 (2012)); HRSA, History, OPTN:
Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, http://
optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/optn/history.asp (last visited Aug. 25, 2014)
[hereinafter History].

12.

42 U.S.C. § 273 (2012).

13.

Id.

14.

Id.
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Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN).15 OPTN’s
function is to establish a national organ registry for both those in
need of organs and potential donors.16 The OPTN falls under the
direction of the Health Resources and Services Administration
(HRSA),17 but the non-profit United Network for Organ Sharing
(UNOS) administers the network and transplant lists.18 UNOS was
given the initial contract for the administration of the OPTN in 1986
and has administered the network ever since.19 Even though UNOS is
responsible for administering the transplant network, the leadership
between UNOS and OPTN is seamless. The OPTN has its own board
of directors that creates the organ allocation protocols used by UNOS,
but every member of the UNOS board is also a member of the
OPTN board.20
Although the OPTN is administered by a non-profit organization
that does not include any government actors, the OPTN is still a
government agency. It was created by an act of Congress and falls
under the auspices of the Secretary of Health and Human Services
and the HRSA. Because the OPTN is a government agency but is
administered by non-government actors, this raises the question of
whether the privatization of such government functions is justified.
Article I of the Constitution states, “All legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which
shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives,”21 yet this
language neither explicitly prohibits nor permits Congress to make
broad delegations to administrative agencies.22 Congress’s ability to
make such delegations rests on the separation of powers doctrine and

15.

It is important to note that OPTN refers to both the actual network for
organ donation and transplantation and the governing body that creates
the protocols for organ allocation. HRSA, Board Q&A, OPTN: Organ
Procurement and Transplantation Network, http://optn.
transplant.hrsa.gov/members/bodQA.asp (last visited Aug. 25, 2014)
[hereinafter Board Q&A].

16.

42 U.S.C. § 274 (2012).

17.

HRSA, About Us: Division of Transplantation, Organdonor.gov,
http://organdonor.gov/aboutus.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2013). The
HRSA is itself under the auspices of the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services. HHS Organizational Chart, U.S. Dep’t of
Health and Human Ser’s., http://www.hhs.gov/about/orgchart/
(last visited Aug. 25, 2014).

18.

History, supra note 11.

19.

Id.

20.

Board Q&A, supra note 15.

21.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.

22.

See Richard J. Pierce Jr. et al., Administrative Law and
Process 49 (6th ed. 2014).
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is permissible “as long as Congress creates sufficient safeguards to
ensure that the assignment will not impermissibly undermine the
ability of any branch of government to perform its constitutional
role.”23 Congress may have the power to make delegations to nongovernment agencies, but there are some limits within which Congress
must operate for these delegations to be constitutional.24
B.

Rationale for the Administration of OPTN by the Non-Profit UNOS

Since the late twentieth century, the United States government
has increasingly delegated what were traditionally considered public
functions to private actors.25 In his first term alone, President Obama
continued this trend of government outsourcing by utilizing private
actors for areas of government administration ranging from Homeland
Security to collecting overdue taxes and modernizing Coast Guard
vessels.26 While this practice is extremely popular today, the courts
did not always look upon such delegations favorably.
During the New Deal, the Supreme Court wanted to limit private
delegations of power by both Congress and President Roosevelt.27 In
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,28 the Court declared,
“Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President to
exercise an unfettered discretion to make whatever laws he thinks
may be needed or advisable for the rehabilitation and expansion of
trade or industry.”29 Similarly, in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,30 the
Court held that the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act was
unconstitutional because “[t]he power conferred upon the majority is,
in effect, the power to regulate the affairs of an unwilling minority.
23.

Neil Kinkopf, Of Devolution, Privatization, and Globalization:
Separation of Powers Limits on Congressional Authority to Assign
Federal Power to Non-Federal Actors, 50 Rutgers L. Rev. 331, 336
(1998) (analyzing the application of the separation of powers doctrine to
congressional delegations of federal power to nonfederal actors).

24.

Id. at 338–39.

25.

Kevin R. Kosar, Cong. Research Serv., RL33777, Privatization
and the Federal Government: An Introduction at 2, 32 (2006).

26.

Harold J. Krent, The Private Performing the Public: Delimiting
Delegations to Private Parties, 65 U. Miami L. Rev. 507, 518 (2011).

27.

See Pierce et al., supra note 22, at 50–51.

28.

295 U.S. 495 (1935).

29.

Id. at 537–38; see Pierce et al., supra note 22, at 51–52. Schechter
Poultry examined the constitutionality of provisions in the National
Industrial Recovery Act that allowed firms in an industry to agree upon
codes of competition in order to minimize price increases as well as wage
increases for industry workers. The constitutional issue was truly rooted
in the fact that the President was the only one with the authority to
enforce the codes as long as the codes served the purpose of the NIRA.

30.

298 U.S. 238 (1936).
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This is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not
even delegation to an official or an official body, presumptively
disinterested, but to private persons.”31 The majority referred to by
the Court consisted of mining operations that produced more than
two-thirds of the nation’s coal and employed more than one-half of
the nation’s coal miners.32 The delegation in Carter Coal was so
repugnant to the Court because it was not to a regulatory
government body but to the titans of the coal industry who would
likely further their own interests at the expense of smaller mining
operations.33 The Court’s reasoning in both Schechter Poultry and
Carter Coal suggests that those decisions were not really about
Congress’s giving up power to agencies but about decisions that
stemmed from the Court’s fears about delegating the exercise of
public authority to the private sector. The Court feared that the
private sector lacked the ability to constrain government actors and
the decision-making capabilities to act as disinterested parties.34
Although the nondelegation doctrine rose to prominence during
the New Deal, the Court’s decisions in cases such as Carter Coal and
Schechter Poultry are largely viewed as “atypical.”35 The Court has
never overturned these New Deal era decisions, but, as indicated
earlier, these are the only cases in which the Court struck down a
federal law on nondelegation grounds.36 The Court has “thus
continued to accept the delegation of the power to make rules to
agencies. Vague delegations that otherwise might be excessive would
pass muster if the scope of power was narrower, or if those subject to
the agency’s regulatory efforts were afforded sufficient procedural
protection.”37 Since the New Deal era, the Court has upheld all
legislation that it has reviewed under the nondelegation doctrine, and
the doctrine has effectively disappeared with the rise in privatization
of government functions.38 While government delegation of public
functions has increased significantly in recent years, with the

31.

Id. at 311.

32.

Id. at 310.

33.

Id. at 310–11.

34.

Aaron R. Cooper, Note, Sidestepping Chevron: Reframing Agency
Deference in an Era of Private Governance, 99 Geo. L.J. 1431, 1438
(2011).

35.

Pierce et al., supra note 22, at 52–53.

36.

Id. at 52–54.

37.

Id. at 52.

38.

Id. at 50, 52; see also Cooper, supra note 34, at 1447. The Supreme
Court effectively abandoned the nondelegation doctrine for good in
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assoc. Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
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privatization of everything from federal prisons and welfare benefits39
to “private accreditation organizations to determine hospitals’
eligibility for federal funding,”40 many questions and concerns remain
regarding the constitutionality of these delegations and how to keep
the private organizations accountable.
Nothing in the Constitution explicitly or implicitly prohibits the
President and Congress from delegating authority to private
individuals, yet as evidenced by the nondelegation doctrine, the
“silence in the Constitution . . . should not be construed as authorization for unlimited delegations to private entities.”41 Because the
Constitution is silent regarding delegation of power to private actors,
Congress and the judiciary must ensure that a delegation of
congressional powers is permissible. One method of determining if a
delegation is permissible is to examine the enabling act creating the
delegation and to decide whether the act has meaningful standards,
i.e., an “intelligible principle.”42
“When Congress confers decision-making authority upon agencies,
Congress must ‘lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to
which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to
conform.’”43 An intelligible principle is a standard to which the person
or agency authorized to carry out the Act must conform in order for
the act to be a valid delegation of legislative power.44 An intelligible
principle can be a broad guideline, and it is considered constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general policy,
the public agency that is to apply it, and the boundaries of the
delegated authority.45
The text of the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA), the
enabling act for the creation of OPTN/UNOS, clearly contains an
intelligible principle and is thus a permissible delegation of
congressional power. Firstly, Congress uses clear language allowing
the Secretary of Health and Human Services to “make grants for the
planning of qualified organ procurement organizations” and sets out a
clear timetable for when certain tasks related to the establishment of
the agency must be accomplished.46 Secondly, Congress provides strict
39.

Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 Colum. L. Rev.
1367, 1383 (2003).

40.

Krent, supra note 26, at 520.

41.

Id. at 523; see U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.

42.

Charles H. Koch Jr. et al., Administrative Law: Cases and
Materials 58 (6th ed. 2010).

43.

Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assoc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).

44.

J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).

45.

Koch et al., supra note 42, at 58.

46.

42 U.S.C. § 273(a)–(b) (2012).
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guidelines for what existing organizations can qualify to become the
national organ procurement organization. The Secretary of Health and
Human Services’ discretion to designate an organization to become
the national procurement agency is clearly defined and curtailed by
the language of the statute.47 Lastly, the National Organ Transplant
Act is also extremely clear about the function and power of OPTN
once the Secretary of Health and Human Services establishes it, and
the implementation of the Act has moved out of the initial start-up
phase. The NOTA plainly states that the Secretary is to contract for
the establishment of OPTN and that the organization itself shall
carry out a list of enumerated functions as well as fulfill certain
criteria.48 While OPTN is given board discretion to create organ
allocation protocols, it is not without oversight from the Secretary of
Health and Human Services. It must submit annual reports to the
Secretary, and the Secretary must also establish procedures that allow
individuals to submit comments and concerns about the manner in
which OPTN is carrying out its delegated functions.49 The NOTA
does delegate power to a private agency; yet the existence of
meaningful standards and an intelligible principle within the enabling
act bind the OPTN, which is given the rulemaking power regarding
organ transplant policies.50 It does not create the type of unlimited
delegation to a private entity deemed impermissible in Carter Coal
and Schechter Poultry.
Delegations to private entities are suspect, but the evidence of an
intelligible principle in the NOTA helps to legitimize the delegation of
agency power by Congress to private actors such as UNOS to
administer the OPTN network and to the OPTN board of directors to
determine the organ allocation protocols used by the network.
Furthermore, private sector expertise may lend greater legitimacy to
agency decision making. Delegations to experts can create more
effective policies, especially in technical fields, such as organ donation
and transplantation, where Congress may not have the medical

47.

See id. § 273(b) stipulates that the organ procurement agency must be,
among other things, a nonprofit, fiscally stable, already certified by the
Secretary, and uses process and performance measures based on
statistical data. Furthermore, the Secretary of Health and Human
services has very little decision-making power in creating the agency as
Congress has stipulated nearly every detail, even down to how the
procurement agency’s board of directors must be composed.

48.

42 U.S.C. § 274 (2012).

49.

Id.

50.

Id.; see also OPTN Policies: Secretarial Review and Appeals,
42 C.F.R. § 121.4 (2013) (outlining the procedural requirements for the
enactment of OPTN organ allocation policies).

188

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 65· Issue 1·2014
The Judge Put Me on the List

expertise or knowledge needed to create effective organ allocation
protocols.51
C. Constitutionality and Accountability

While delegations to private agencies may be constitutional, they
do raise two distinct concerns. First, because private agencies are
given government power but effectively exist outside government
control, the normal checks and balances scheme of the Constitution
does not work to control delegations of power to private actors.52
Second, delegating agency administration to a private actor raises
concerns about the private control of public resources.53 This concern
is especially relevant in the organ transplantation context, where the
resource is particularly precious, and control over it can be a matter
of life or death to those on the transplant list. When the government
delegates the distribution of a resource to a private actor, it is no
longer directly determining entitlement to that resource. But, to
whom the government delegates the power of distribution can have an
effect on access to those resources by program participants.54 For
example, with organ transplants, OPTN, a private non-governmental
actor, controls accesses to organs by determining the selection criteria
for transplant candidates.55 The government’s decision to delegate
power to and to utilize the OPTN thus has a direct effect on who has
access to these precious resources.56
51.

Krent, supra note 26, at 522; see also James O. Freedman, Crisis
and Legitimacy: The Administrative Process and American
Government 93–94 (1978) (“There will of course be occasions when
Congress cannot make wise decisions because experience with the
substantive areas under consideration is too limited and the policy
questions that must be answers are still too indistinct to permit
responsible lawmaking . . . . In such cases, broad delegations of
legislative power to administrative agencies are essential if effective
governmental action is to be taken. . . .”).

52.

Justice Scalia articulated this concern regarding checks and balances in
his dissent in Mistretta v. United States. Scalia advocated that
nondelegation principles should remain relevant when the agency
delegation falls outside a constitutional check. 488 U.S. 361, 422 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).

53.

Metzger, supra note 39, at 1396.

54.

Id. at 1396, 1400 (“[P]rivatization frequently occurs in contexts marked
by relations of dependence, in particular social welfare and human
service programs. Those implementing such programs, whether public or
private, gain power over program participants by virtue of their control
over vital resources, as well as their greater knowledge and expertise.”).

55.

Board Q&A, supra note 15.

56.

For additional examples of how the selection of non-government actors
can affect program participants, see Metzger, supra note 39, at 1397–
1401.
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In order to mitigate these concerns, scholars have offered a
variety of solutions. Harold Krent advocates fixing the problem
internally by providing extensive guidelines indicating exactly where
the delegated agency’s power lies.57 Conversely, Jody Freeman
advocates utilizing an aggregate system that combines the court
system and internal agency procedures58 while also applying
Administrative Procedure Act standards to private actors.59 In the
context of organ transplantation, extending the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) to a private actor, OPTN/UNOS, and using
traditional theories of judicial review of agency action may be an
effective solution. This method would implement the traditional
framework of utilizing the judiciary for review of agency actions but
extend it one step further to private actors who carry out government
agency functions.60

II. Agency Accountability: Role of Judicial
Review in Private Delegation
In order to extend the traditional judicial review of agency action
framework to private action, one must first examine judicial review
under the APA and the court-made doctrines generated from
litigation surrounding agency actions. Once this framework is
established, it can then be used to determine how courts should
review the actions of private actors who have been delegated
government functions. Part II of this Note will establish this
framework and apply it to the organ transplant context to determine
the best method for resolving the issues presented in a case like Sarah
Murnaghan’s where a private actor administers the government
agency.

57.

Krent, supra note 26, at 530.

58.

Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative Law, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 813, 846 (2000).

59.

Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 543, 587 (2000). Freeman contends that this would be a viable
solution to the agency accountability problem, but it would require a
shift in traditional attitudes about the application of the APA, which
authorizes judicial review of public functions to private actors.

60.

See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2012) (defining “agency”). Traditionally the APA
and judicial review framework have only applied to public actors and
agencies.
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A. Judicial Review and the APA

In 1946, Congress passed the APA after more than a decade of
political debate.61 The purpose of the APA was to create a set of
regulations for federal agencies and to provide for judicial review of
agency actions. One of the central issues concerning the APA is the
extent to which judicial review applies to agency actions.62 According
to the text of the APA, judicially reviewable agency actions are
“agency action[s] made reviewable by statute and final agency
action[s] for which there is no other adequate remedy . . . .” The APA
also defines the scope of judicial review when examining agency
actions.63 In the organ transplant context, the most relevant provision
under the APA is that “the reviewing court shall— (2) hold unlawful
and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (A)
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.”64 While the APA does not traditionally apply
to private actors,65 an extension may be warranted in situations like
those involving organ transplants because the federal government has
given complete control to the private organization.66 In their
complaint to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the
Murnaghans argued that the under-12 rule for lung transplants
warranted judicial review under the APA because it was arbitrary
and not in accordance with law.67 Arguably, by raising the APA as
61.

George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure
Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1557, 1559–60
(1996).

62.

Clayton P. Gillette & Paul B. Stephan III, Constitutional Limitations
on Privatization, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. Supp. 481, 489 (1998).

63.

5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).

64.

Id.

65.

Freeman, supra note 59, at 587.

66.

While traditionally known for its conceptualization of Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 476 U.S. 837 (1984),
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), may also be a useful
tool for applying the substantive regulations of the APA to private
actors who do not traditionally fall under the APA’s framework. When
looking at the Court’s opinion in Mead, one may notice that it nearly
tracks the language of the APA regarding judicial review, as both are
concerned with reviewing regulations that are arbitrary, capricious, or
contrary to the law. By using the justification from Mead, courts may
be able to circumvent the many hurdles that could ensue in trying to
apply the APA to private actors. It may be easier to apply the language
from Mead to private actors, as it is simply a method of judicial
interpretation, rather than to the APA, which is a statutory scheme
regulating federal agencies. In effect, Mead would bypass the application
issues created by the APA when it comes to private actors while still
allowing for the same substantive review.

67.

Compl., supra note 3, ¶ 53.
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a method for relief, the Murnaghans felt that OPTN is an agency
subject to the power of the federal government and judiciary, and
thus the APA applies to this case, despite the fact that private
actors administer the agency through congressional charter.
OPTN/UNOS are the only organizations that determine the organ
allocation procedures for the federal government’s organ
transplantation network.68 This is not a partial delegation of power to
a private entity but a complete delegation of power because the
private actor is responsible for carrying out all of the agency’s
activities. As a result, the APA should apply to the OPTN because it
is the only federal agency directly responsible for organ transplants
and has complete power to create binding policies for the federal
government. While extending the APA to private actors may be
problematic because it was designed for government agencies, it is one
of the possible solutions to the accountability problem posed by
private actors in government agencies and should not be overlooked.
B. Substantive Review of Agency Actions

Another method of using the court system to review the actions of
private actors operating as government agencies, besides using the
APA framework, would be to take a more substantive, “hard look”
approach for reviewing the actions of private actors. Judge Leventhal,
a proponent of “hard look” review, argued that it is closely tied to the
APA because the APA “requires reviewing courts to consider the
merits of an agency’s action” and to keep in mind the rationality of
the decision based on the record.69 In many ways, this type of review
furthers relationships between the agencies and court system because
it creates a partnership between the groups. Under this approach,
judges work with agencies to further public interests, even when it
means reviewing highly technical agency decisions.70 Just as “hard
look” review applies to government agencies, it could easily apply for
the review of private actors operating as government agencies. The
benefit of “hard look” judicial review is that it examines what is at
the root of the policy and its justifications. Additionally, this policy
seeks to ensure rational outcomes.71 Just like an agency under the
APA, a private actor would only have to produce enough evidence
that its policy was not arbitrary and was appropriately justified.72
68.

Board Q&A, supra note 15.

69.

Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr., “History Belongs to the Winners”: The
Bazelon-Leventhal Debate and the Continuing Relevance of the Process/
Substance Dichotomy in Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 Admin.
L. Rev. 995, 1002 (2006) (citing Int’l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478
F.2d 615, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).

70.

Id. at 1003.

71.

Id. at 997.

72.

Id. at 1003.
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Yet, using this policy would avoid the private/public entanglements
of the APA because judges could simply apply these policies to the
private actors when a party with standing brings suit.
Some, such as the late Judge Bazelon, are concerned that using
substantive “hard look” review will create a problem for generalist
judges who are unfamiliar with the intricate scientific issues agency
action cases can raise.73 While it is important to acknowledge these
fears, they are not truly limitations in the application of “hard look”
review. In many ways, the ability of an agency to acknowledge that a
judge may lack the technical knowledge about its issue creates a
burden-shifting framework whereby agencies are encouraged to work
harder to provide judges with understandable material.74 If agencies
are induced to provide clear, plain-language explanations of their
policies, judges will be able to make better determinations about the
underlying rationale for the policy at hand and the likelihood that
technical language will get in the way of creating an informed and
properly supported judicial decision will be minimized.
C. Court-Created Judicial Review Doctrines: Skidmore and Chevron

In addition to judicial review under the APA and “hard look”
review, there are also two different judicial review models used for
agency actions that could be extended to private actors in the organtransplant context.
The Skidmore doctrine and the Chevron deference doctrine are
judicial review doctrines regarding deference to agency actions
developed by the Supreme Court. These doctrines have waxed and
waned in application and popularity with the Court over the past
sixty years. The oldest of these doctrines, the Skidmore doctrine,
reigned in popularity before 1984, and since 2001 it has experienced a
resurgence with the Court.75 In Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,76 the
Supreme Court held that agency administrators’ interpretations of
their enabling statutes, “while not controlling upon the courts by
reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort
for guidance.”77 Skidmore’s rationale is the least deferential to agency
73.

Id. at 999 (citing Int’l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 652
(1973) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) (“[T]he best way for courts to guard
against unreasonable or erroneous administrative decisions is not for the
judges themselves to scrutinize the technical merits of each decision.”)).

74.

Id. at 1008 (citing Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in Midpassage:
The Uneasy Partnership Between Courts and Agencies Plays On, 32
Tulsa L.J. 221, 235 (1996)).

75.

Richard J. Pierce Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency
Actions Mean?, 63 Admin. L. Rev. 77, 79 (2011).

76.

323 U.S. 134 (1944).

77.

Id. at 140.
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determinations, stating that agency determinations are not controlling
authority but should still be considered in the judicial decisionmaking process.78 Skidmore deference is traditionally applied when the
agency has presented a persuasive argument for why its interpretation
of a particular statute should remain in place.79 Skidmore deference
simply allows the administrative agency to argue its case like any
other litigant, and if the evidence and reasoning is convincing, the
court will reward the agency with deference. An application of
Skidmore could be effective in the organ transplant context. It would
assist judges in surmounting scientific hurdles while allowing them to
make their own determinations about the agency action, especially
when they are able to follow the OPTN’s interpretations and
recommendations as a guide. Allowing courts to apply Skidmore to a
private actor like OPTN would negate the concerns raised by those
like Judge Bazelon who do not believe judges are capable of making
decisions regarding scientific material. Applying Skidmore would
afford judges the option of deferring to experts in the field or the
agency, or of simply taking the agency’s recommendations into
consideration in order to determine the overall persuasiveness of the
agency’s interpretation without having to automatically accept or
reject the agency’s argument.80
The most influential judicial review doctrine, and probably the
most widely studied, was introduced by the Supreme Court’s opinion
in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.81
Chevron is significant jurisprudence in administrative law because, in
the Chevron decision, the Court announced that when Congress has
left a statutory interpretation decision to an agency, the Court will
defer to that decision as long as it is reasonable. This gave agencies
greater power to create their own methods for carrying out Congress’s
objective when Congress has supplied them with minimal guidance in
the enabling statute. In Chevron, the Court stated that when the
intent of Congress is clear from the statute’s language, the inquiry
into the agency’s interpretation ceases.82 Therefore, if Congress itself
has answered the particular question at issue with regard to the
agency’s interpretation, the congressional answer, not the agency
determination, controls, and the agency must defer to Congress’s
interpretation. But “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect
to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s

78.

Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern
Skidmore Standard, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1235, 1240–41 (2007).

79.

Id. at 1252.

80.

Krotoszynski, supra note 69, at 999.

81.

467 U.S. 837 (1984).

82.

Id. at 842–43.
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answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”83 The
two-part Chevron test can be simplified to mean “reviewing court[s]
must uphold any reasonable agency construction of an agencyadministered statute.”84 Chevron’s holding is referred to as the
Chevron deference doctrine because it is extremely deferential to
agency decisions regarding statutory interpretations of enabling
statutes giving the agency power. It essentially allows the court to
approve of the policy-making ability of the agency “in lieu of
Congress.”85 Because it is extremely deferential, Chevron applies when
statutory interpretation questions exist that require gap filling by the
agency because Congress has not directly spoken on the issue in the
enabling statute.86 Congress may have spoken about what it would
like the agency to do generally, but it has not provided the agency
with specific procedures. In this case, Chevron deference will apply
and the court will defer to the agency interpretation of the enabling
statute, as long as it is reasonable, even if the court prefers a different
outcome or interpretation of the statute’s text. While Chevron is a
useful tool for government agencies, its application relies on the
supposition that agencies are politically accountable and the political
process will censure the agency for any unreasonable interpretations of
statutes. As a result, this judicial review model may not be the most
appropriate framework for application to a private actor, as a private
actor does not face political repercussions for its decisions and
policies.87
Since the Court’s decision in United States v. Mead Corp.,88
Chevron deference is no longer exclusively applied in situations where
an agency has exercised its powers of statutory interpretation.
Instead, Mead illustrates that Chevron deference applies only in
certain statutory interpretation scenarios; when Chevron is not
applicable, the Skidmore deference framework should apply.89
According to the Court’s opinion in Mead,
83.

Id. at 843. This is what makes the Chevron decision so significant. The
Court is stating that it will defer to the agency’s interpretation, not
Congress’s, when Congress left gaps in the statutes that the agency
administers.

84.

Pierce, supra note 75, at 79.

85.

Cooper, supra note 34, at 1449.

86.

Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 1271, 1301
(2008).

87.

Cooper, supra note 34, at 1451. Private actors exist outside the
constitutional framework that insures political accountability; therefore,
there is no true check on an agency’s policies if the court is willing to
apply true Chevron deference and defer to agency interpretations in all
instances for which Congress has given the agency rule-making power.

88.

533 U.S. 218 (2001).

89.

Pierce, supra note 75, at 79.
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When Congress has “explicitly left a gap for an agency to fill,
there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to
elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation,”
Chevron, 467 U.S., at 843–844, and any ensuing regulation is
binding in the courts unless procedurally defective, arbitrary or
capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.90

In the post-Mead era, Chevron deference has been limited in agency
actions where courts can “reasonably infer that Congress would have
intended to give agencies the authority to act with ‘the force of
law.’”91 In reality, Chevron deference as it exists today comes down
to formality, recognizing that different delegations by Congress
and methods of interpretation by agencies deserve different
measures of deference.92 For agency policies to receive Chevron
deference, the policies must come from rulemaking procedures.93
Agency guidelines and documents interpreting its regulations
extremely broadly are not likely to get Chevron deference today,
whereas they may have in the past.94
In a case such as Sarah Murnaghan’s, where a private actor
administers a government agency, Chevron deference is the
appropriate standard of review. The controversy regarding the under12 rule for lung transplants is really a statutory interpretation issue
regarding how OPTN and the Secretary of Health and Human
Services are interpreting the NOTA. The NOTA, as amended by the
Children’s Health Act,95 specifically states that OPTN recognizes the
“differences in health and in organ transplantation issues between
children and adults throughout the system and adopt criteria,
policies, and procedures that address the unique health care needs of
children.”96 This provision supports the dual policies for pediatric vs.
adult candidates for lung transplants. By establishing the under-12
rule and making the distinction between transplant candidates, the
OPTN has taken the “unique health care needs of children” into
account.97 In fact, the NOTA specifically authorizes the OPTN to
engage in projects to increase transplantation among populations with
90.

Mead, 533 U.S. at 227.

91.

Criddle, supra note 86, at 1301.

92.

Mead, 533 U.S. at 236.

93.

Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).

94.

Helpful Cases, Admin. L. Rev.: Pub. Res., http://www.administrative
lawreview.org/publicresources/index.php?option=com_content&view=a
rticle&id=2&Itemid=4 (last visited Sept. 14, 2014).

95.

Children’s Health Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106–310, 114 Stat. 1101
(2000).

96.

Id.

97.

Id.
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special medical needs, such as children.98 While the under-12 policy
for lung allocation may seem counterintuitive to these goals, there is
nothing in the NOTA that prevents OPTN from drawing age
distinctions when allocating organs. OPTN is simply charged with
creating policies that effectively and efficiently distribute organs to
those in need of life-saving transplants. Some of these policies will
require that distinctions be drawn between adult and pediatric
candidates, as these are different patient populations whose needs and
considerations must be taken into account, a fact acknowledged
within the language of the NOTA itself.99
Furthermore, Christensen v. Harris County supports applying
Chevron deference to the OPTN regulations.100 In Christensen, the
Court held that “the framework of deference set forth in Chevron does
apply to agency interpretation contained in a regulation,” but
“opinion letters—like interpretations contained in policy statements,
agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the
force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference.”101 The OPTN
regulations for organ allocation should be given Chevron deference
because the organ allocations policies are not opinion letters or policy
statements; they carry the “force of law.” According to the federal
regulations governing the OPTN, the OPTN is responsible for
creating organ allocation policies, but these policies must be
submitted to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, who then
publishes them in the Federal Register for public comment.102 This
notice and comment procedure is more suggestive of rulemaking
procedures than the creation of non-binding policy statements.103 Yet
while the regulations are specific in the tasks they charge the OPTN
with completing, they are rather ambiguous about how the OPTN
should create the allocation policies. The regulations provide detailed
timelines and notification procedures for the dissemination of OPTN
policies but leave the actual allocation decisions to the OPTN board
of directors.104 This ambiguity in the regulations does not mean that
the OPTN policy should not be given Chevron deference, for lack of
specificity in the regulations is not a barrier to applying Chevron. An
agency’s interpretation of the regulations can receive deference when

98.

Id.

99.

Id.

100. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
101. Id. at 587.
102. OPTN Policies: Secretarial Review and Appeals, 42 C.F.R. § 121.4
(2013).
103. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 586–89.
104. 42 C.F.R. § 121.4.
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the regulation’s language is ambiguous.105 The OPTN regulations are
themselves ambiguous regarding criteria for the organ allocation
policies, but despite this ambiguity, the actual, binding organ
allocation policies created by OPTN should be given Chevron
deference. Even though the OPTN is a third party, non-government
actor, the federal regulations are directed at the OPTN’s
administration of the Organ Procurement and Transplantation
Network and the policies created to carry out that network. There
should not be any barrier to applying Chevron deference to the
OPTN just because it does not fit the traditional government agency
framework. The only limitation to an application of Chevron
deference to the under-12 rule would be a finding that the rule is
“procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or
manifestly contrary to the statute.”106
The Court should apply Chevron deference, but even if it chooses
to engage in a substantive review under Skidmore, the key issue under
either deference doctrine is still whether the OPTN under-12 rule for
lung transplants is justified. When the OPTN created the distinction
between transplant candidates over and under twelve years old, the
line drawn was not the result of arbitrary decision making, but rather
a well-considered distinction supported by the medical evidence and
the medical community. When the policy was originally created by
OPTN, the Thoracic Transplant Committee recognized that patients
under twelve who were in need of lung transplants represented a
smaller percentage of transplant candidates and included many
candidates with pulmonary diseases not found in the adult candidate
population. For these reasons, the committee felt that using the Lung
Allocation Score (LAS) model traditionally used for adults107 was not
applicable to children under twelve, and waiting time was the most
effective way to place pediatric candidates on their list so that they
would be given “first priority for organs best suited for them—those
from 0 [to] 11 year old donors.”108

105. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
106. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001).
107. The LAS determines a candidate’s placement on the adult transplant
list. It is calculated using the candidate’s age, the candidate’s body mass
index, the candidate’s individual and group diagnosis, clinical
parameters such as oxygen use, and the candidate’s functional status.
OPTN/UNOS Executive Committee Meeting Materials (June 10, 2013),
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Exec_
Comm_mtng_materials_06-10-13.pdf.
108. Letter from Dr. John Roberts to Kathleen Sebelius (May 30, 2013), in
OPTN/UNOS Executive Committee Meeting Materials (June 10, 2013),
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Exec_
Comm_mtng_materials_06-10-13.pdf.
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Many of the justifications surrounding the usage of the under-12
policy by OPTN relate to size issues that are encountered with
pediatric lung transplant patients.109 “In no other field does the saying
that ‘children are not small adults’ ring more true than in
transplantation [since] pediatric lung transplant recipients are very
different than their adult counterparts.”110 Pediatric lung transplants
involve unique complications that are not seen in adults, namely,
growth and developmental issues as a child’s lungs will have to
increase in size with the child as it ages and develops.111 These issues
with size also support the separate pediatric listing procedures, as
there are limits on how significantly adult lungs can be scaled down
for transplantation into a child.112 Opponents of the current OPTN
pediatric lung allocation policy argue that “age is a poor proxy for
size.”113 There are patients who fall into the under-12 scheme and
meet the size requirements for adult lungs but are not eligible because
of their age.114 Yet despite this seeming injustice, the under-12
distinction is fair and reasonable, and thus the OPTN policy should
be given deference under both Skidmore and Chevron. The current
OPTN policy may not be optimal, but it is the most ethical due to
the lack of data needed to verify that using LAS scores to determine
organ allocation in pediatric candidates or the optimal LAS score to

109. See id. (Typically donor lungs are matched to candidates on the height
of the donor and recipient. For this reason, transplant candidates under
age twelve can often only receive lungs from other pediatric donors); see
also Press Release, OPTN/UNOS Executive Committee Approves
Discretionary Listing of Pediatric Lung Transplant Candidates,
OPTN/UNOS (June 10, 2013), optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/news/news
Detail.asp?id=1598 (last visited Aug. 27, 2014) (“[O]nly one lung
transplant in the United States has occurred from a donor older than
age 18 into a recipient younger than 12 since 2007.”).
110. Albert Faro et al., American Society of Transplantation Executive
Summary on Pediatric Lung Transplantation, 7 Am. J. of Transplant. 285, 290 (2007).
111. Id. at 288; but cf. id. at 290 (discussing that the findings of one study
indicate that “the overall rate of somatic cell growth was roughly 64%”
of the estimated rate, thus indicating that pediatric transplants can, in
fact, achieve somatic growth).
112. Melinda Solomon et al., Pediatric Lung Transplantation, 57 Ped. Clin.
N. Am. 375, 379 (2010). If a child is physically too small for the actual
donor lung to be transplanted in its entirety, transplant recipients may
receive a lobar transplant, which is just implanting the right or left
lower lobe of the donor lungs.
113. Keren Ladin & Douglas W. Hanto, Rationing Lung Transplants—
Procedural Fairness in Allocation and Appeals, 369 New Eng. J. Med.
599, 599 (2013).
114. Id.
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trigger list placement.115 At the end of 2012, there were only 44
candidates on the pediatric lung transplant list, compared to 1,616
candidates on the adult transplant list, and only twelve pediatric lung
transplants were performed in 2012.116 The sheer lack of data available
to access whether another policy would be more efficient is one of the
key reasons that the current policy remains in place, as it is medically
and ethically justified.117 The policy results in fairness and legitimacy
in allocating health resources, thus resulting in outcomes that should
be acceptable to all.118 Furthermore the structure of the current policy
is reasonable because it allows for the greatest degree of fairness
among transplant candidates.119
The OPTN under-12 policy is both ethically and medically
justified and reasonable and should thus receive deference under both
the Skidmore and Chevron frameworks. Using judicial review of the
OPTN organ allocation policy is but one viable alternative for
determining whether the policy is justified or whether the agency
needs to revise its procedures. Whether or not the policy is
reasonable, the question that ultimately remains is exactly who
decides whether or not an agency policy is reasonable, especially when
a private, non-government act administers the agency.

III. Future Applications: Who Decides?
In this age of increasing privatization of government functions, it
is not inconceivable that a situation similar to Sarah Murnaghan’s
will arise again—if not in the organ context, then in another area of
government privatization. With this thought and the legal framework
developed in Parts I and II in mind, Part III will develop viable
solutions for review of agency actions where the agency is
administered by a private, non-governmental actor, such as
OPTN/UNOS. Three possible solutions for a situation similar to
Sarah Murnaghan’s are (1) using only the courts and judicial review,
(2) allowing agencies to initiate an internal review, or (3) implementing a hybrid method similar to the actions of Judge Baylson in
the Murnaghan case that uses judicial review but also allows the
agency to begin an internal review process in order to make a more
permanent change.120
115. Id. at 600.
116. Valapour et al., supra note 2, at 144, 148, 157.
117. Faro et al., supra note 110, at 290.
118. Ladin & Hanto, supra note 113, at 600.
119. See infra, Part III.A (discussing the equitable fairness issues surrounding
using appeals to federal courts for transplant list placement).
120. Order, supra note 8.
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A. Using the “Only the Court System” and Judicial Review

As illustrated in Parts II.B and II.C, judicial review doctrines
could create effective solutions for evaluating agency actions when a
private actor administers the agency’s function. These models would
allow citizens to directly appeal the implementation of agency policy.
In many ways, this method would rely on a process that is similar to
the state-action doctrine used in constitutional and civil rights cases
for the enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause against private entities with government entanglements.
Under the state action doctrine, a private entity is in effect bound
by the same regulations as governmental entities when the private
entity falls under the control of or receives a substantial benefit from
the government so that the entity can no longer be considered “purely
private.”121 In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,122 the city of
Wilmington created a parking garage with connecting retail space.
The city leased one of these spaces to Eagle Coffee Shop and, as
part of the lease, also agreed to pay the utilities for the space and
offered certain tax exemptions to Eagle.123 Burton was refused
service by Eagle because he was an African American and brought
suit, arguing that Eagle violated his Fourteenth Amendment
rights.124 After examining the relationship between Eagle and the
City of Wilmington, the Supreme Court ultimately held that the
city’s dealings with Eagle amounted to “the degree of state
participation and involvement in discriminatory action which it
was the design of the Fourteenth Amendment to condemn.”125
Because Eagle was so intertwined with the City of Wilmington,
Eagle was subject to the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment even though it was a private establishment, not a government entity.
Applying a scheme that is akin to the state action doctrine to
private actors who administer agency functions would bridge the gap
between the governmental actor and the private entity with
administrative power. In the organ transplant context, this would
mean that OPTN/UNOS would, in essence, be Eagle with the
Department of Health and Human Services analogous to the City of
121. Burton v. Wilington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725–26 (1961); see
also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1947) (“It is doubtless true that
a State may act through different agencies . . . and the prohibitions of
the [Fourteenth A]mendment extend to all action of the State denying
equal protection of the laws, whether it be action by one of these
agencies or another.”).
122. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
123. Id. at 719.
124. Id. at 720.
125. Id. at 724.
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Wilmington. Under this rationale, OPTN/UNOS would be subject to
the same regulations and oversight as the Department of Health and
Human Services, an accountable government agency. A model similar
to the state action doctrine could bring the private actors into the
constitutional framework and also subject them to a certain measure
of political accountability through review by the judiciary, insuring
that their policies are in accordance with the law.126 Additionally, a
judicial review regime would allow the court to ensure that the
private actors are accountable, while at the same time still using a
Chevron deference framework to defer to professionals who are likely
more equipped to weigh the costs and benefits of a policy decision for
the group at large rather than one particular party.
Conversely, if every potential plaintiff who has an issue with his
or her placement on a transplant list or how organs were allocated
can file a suit in federal court, a flood of litigation could occur by
patients seeking to improve their chances of receiving an organ.127 In
many ways, the organ allocation protocols implemented by OPTN are
designed to avoid these litigation problems and the subsequent
inequities that could result. The allocation protocol insures that
procedural fairness remains paramount in the process. Using a system
of judicial appeals for organ placement would, in essence, “grant
discretionary access to wealthier people, exacerbating disparities and
discrimination.”128 Not every child’s parents would be able to afford
the legal services necessary to file an effective complaint in the
manner that the Murnaghans were able to do for Sarah. In a system
based on purely judicial review, these children, who could potentially
be the most deserving based on medical criteria, would be left to the
mercy of the system. Without any other alternatives to improve their
chances of receiving an organ transplant, they would have to hope
that someone with greater financial resources does not use the court
system to improve his or her placement to the detriment of those who
cannot afford to use the legal system to the same end. While a system
that uses purely judicial review for OPTN appeals seems attractive, it
could come at a greater cost to the poor, it could decrease transparency, and it could undermine a fair process, which could lead to
decreases in donation rates.129 On a theoretical level, rigorous judicial
review may also undermine the expertise of the organization that
126. The wording of the APA and the Court’s opinion in United States v.
Mead Corp. support this position as they both stress that, when
reviewing agency actions, judges should be concerned with determining
whether the regulation is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the law.
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012); 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
127. Ladin & Hanto, supra note 113, at 599.
128. Id. at 601.
129. Id. at 599–600.

202

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 65· Issue 1·2014
The Judge Put Me on the List

administers the organ allocation system.130 Judicial review is a viable
option for evaluating the actions of private actors engaged in
government functions, but it is not the best option in the organ
transplant context. Although it may work for other areas of
government privatization that are concerned with less precious
resources, the potential inequalities that could result from the use of
only judicial review to evaluate OPTN policies are too great.
B. Internal Review of Protocol Initiated by the Agency

Of the possible methods for reviewing agency actions, a process
using internal review initiated by the agency is the least effective
solution for non-government actors who administer government
agencies and functions. First, it is often harder for insiders to see that
a policy or protocol may be broken or that there are other, more
viable alternatives to the policy available. After receiving a petition
from Sarah Murnaghan’s family, Secretary of Health and Human
Services Kathleen Sebelius asked OPTN to begin a review of the
under-12 policy.131 While Secretary Sebelius acknowledged that there
might be a problem with the policy, her solution to begin a review
period does not change the circumstances of someone like Sarah,
whose death was imminent unless the OPTN policy changed the
under-12 rule. An internal review may have created an effective policy
change for the group at large, but it would not improve the
circumstances of the person actually appealing the agency’s policy and
spurring the agency to start the investigative process, especially when
that person may have only days to live.
Except for emergency meetings of the Executive Committee, the
OPTN board convenes only twice a year. This means that any truly
long-term change in policy will likely occur surrounding one of these
twice-yearly meetings.132 These meetings do not offer an immediate
130. In undermining the expertise and operations of the private agency,
which has been delegated congressional power, the judiciary may also
encounter a separation of powers argument. Hypothetically, heightened
judicial intervention could be viewed as the judiciary interfering with a
legitimate delegation of legislative power by Congress if the judiciary
interferes to the extent that the agency cannot carry out the functions
entrusted to it by its enabling act.
131. Letter from Kathleen Sebelius to Dr. John Roberts (May 31, 2013), in
OPTN/UNOS Executive Committee Meeting Materials (June 10, 2013),
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Exec_
Comm_mtng_materials_06-10-13.pdf.
132. Press Release, OPTN/UNOS, supra note 109 (After a June 11, 2013,
OPTN/UNOS executive committee meeting, the organization decided to
suspend policy preventing candidates from appealing the under-12
classification for lung transplants. Candidates may now submit a request
to the national lung review board so that they can be co-listed on the
pediatric and adult/adolescent list. This policy will stay in effect until
July 1, 2014, pending further action by OPTN/UNOS.).
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solution for individuals like Sarah Murnaghan, unless the executive
committee decides to take action at an emergency meeting.133 In fact,
the OPTN lung allocation policy for patients under twelve was
permanently amended as of July 3, 2014.134 Under the new allocation
protocol, patients under twelve are “assigned a priority for lung
allocation that is based on medical urgency.”135 More importantly, a
patient and the patient’s physicians now have greater recourse if they
feel the patient’s priority level does not adequately reflect the medical
necessity and urgency of the transplant.136 As demonstrated by
OPTN’s yearlong decision-making process, internal review by the
agency does not account for the timely decision-making ability that is
essential in the organ transplant context when it becomes evident
that an immediate change to the protocol is necessary. Sarah
Murnaghan was not in a position to wait an entire year for change to
OPTN’s policy. She needed an effective change to the lung allocation
protocol immediately. Internal agency review does not necessarily
facilitate swift decision making, nor does internal review account for
the possible internal agency bias against assertions that its policy may
be broken.
Internal agency biases result because “[a]lthough expertise and the
group nature of agency decision-making can alleviate many such
biases, it can also amplify some biases.”137 This phenomenon is known
as confirmation bias. Decision makers who suffer from confirmation
bias validate an initial conclusion even in the face of contradicting
evidence or interpret the information they have readily available so
that it fits their conclusion, even when it does not fully support their

133. It is important to note that the OPTN emergency meeting was
convened on June 10, after the judge issued the TRO for Sarah’s family,
suspending the under-12 policy as it applied to her. By June 15, 2013,
Sarah had already received two lung transplants. Order, supra note 8;
Press Release, OPTN/UNOS, supra note 109.
134. Policy Notice from James B. Alcorn to Transplant Professionals,
Changes to OPTN Bylaws and Policies from actions at June Board of
Directors Meeting (July 1, 2014).
135. OPTN, Policies § 10.1, Allocation of Lungs: Priorities and
Score Assignments for Lung Candidates (July 3, 2014).
136. Id. at § 10.2.B. Transplant programs can now request that patients be
co-listed on the pediatric and adolescent transplant lists. This request is
evaluated by the Lung Review Board (LRB), which has seven days from
when the request is sent to make a decision. If the LRB denies the
request, the transplant program can appeal the decision. Furthermore, if
the LRB denies an initial request or appeal, the transplant program can
override the decision, subject to review and possible censure by the
Membership and Professional Standards Committee. Id.
137. Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial
Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 486, 492 (2002).
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proposition.138 In the organ transplant context, internal agency bias is
highly likely as OPTN is given great deference by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services in creating the allocation policies for each
organ. OPTN was unlikely to realize on its own that its policy was
ineffective or unbeneficial. It needed an inciting event—Sarah
Murnaghan’s complaint in federal court—to realize that its under-12
policy for lung allocations may not be the appropriate protocol.139 The
events surrounding Sarah Murnaghan filing her complaint and
OPTN’s response corresponds exactly to Mark Seidenfeld’s rationale
for when an agency will realize it needs to change a rule or policy:
“For an agency to change a rule, it needs feedback that the rule is not
working satisfactorily. An agency usually will not alter a decisionmaking rule unless it faces a crisis that vividly calls into question the
rule’s benefits.”140 Moreover, it is likely that OPTN members share
similar individual biases because of shared professional norms and
ethical beliefs about organ allocation. These shared values may make
it difficult for committee members to consider how others, such as
patients or those in the legal system, look at these decisions in light of
other seemingly logical alternatives.141
Due to the problematic nature of using only internally motivated
agency review, it should not be the singular method used to review
private agency actions. Yet, purely judicial review may not be the
paramount solution; it may make confirmation bias worse as the
accountability assessment inherent in judicial review may make
agencies even less likely to realize that their reasoning was flawed.142
The best system for assessing private agency actions is a system that
combines the most effective aspects of both judicial review and
internal, self-motivated agency review.
C. The Hybrid Method: Judicial and Internal Review

The ideal method for reviewing the actions of private actors who
have been delegated government functions in the organ transplant
context is a hybrid method that incorporates judicial review and
internal agency evaluation. In situations where there is no recourse for
appeal within the agency framework, or where the agency has made
its final determination, a plaintiff should be able to file a complaint in
court so that the agency policy can be evaluated for arbitrariness,
fairness, and to ensure that it is actually in accordance with the
138. Id. at 504.
139. See Press Release, supra note 109.
140. Seidenfeld, supra note 137, at 494.
141. Id. at 536–37.
142. Id. at 524.
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powers delegated to the agency by the enabling statute. The court
system should be the first step in remedying an agency protocol
created by a private actor, unless the agency has already taken the
initiative to begin a review of the policy. Judges should be able to
determine if an agency protocol needs to be reevaluated, and if
necessary, suspended as it applies to the individual filing the
complaint. Allowing judges to take the first step in determining that
an agency policy may be flawed avoids the issues created by
confirmation bias as it puts the agency on notice that its policy may
no longer be the most effective course of action. A judge should be
allowed to create a temporary solution for the individual who has
petitioned the court, especially in situations for which a timely
response is paramount; this temporary solution, however, should not
automatically change the agency’s protocol, as a judge cannot weigh
all of the relevant factors in the same manner as the agency. In this
regard, Judge Baylson was correct in issuing the TRO and suspending
the OPTN policy for lung allocation to those under twelve as it
applied to Sarah’s circumstances and in refraining from issuing a
broad-based ruling about the OPTN under-12 rule in general.143
Once the judge has determined that the protocol is broken, the
burden should shift to the agency to decide whether they need to
change the policy and, if so, what that policy change should entail.
This ensures that the most informed decision makers are the ones
creating the policy but also that the ethical integrity of the organ
allocation system is maintained. Using a hybrid method would allow
candidates to resort to judicial review only after the final agency
determination has been issued or if there is no internal remedy. This
approach avoids the flood of litigation that is feared in only a judicial
review system while still allowing candidates recourse from agency
decisions.144 A hybrid method also ensures that organ allocation
remains rooted in fairness by creating a policy that is truly unbiased
toward the transplant candidates—from their initial placement on the
transplant list through the final agency determination and beyond.

Conclusion
As the United States continues the twentieth-century trend of
privatizing government programs and functions, the question will not
be whether these delegations are justified to private actors but how
the decision making of these private, non-government actors is
controlled within the current administrative framework of the APA
and the use of judicial review. Because these actors exist outside
traditional administrative law norms, viable solutions must be created
143. Order, supra note 8.
144. Ladin & Hanto, supra note 113, at 599.
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to keep these privately administered agencies accountable and, at the
same time, to provide those who interact with these agencies a
method of recourse when an agency policy seems arbitrary or
ineffective. Sarah Murnaghan’s case is likely only the beginning of
what will be a long line of disputes as the United States government
continues to outsource its public functions across diverse areas of
government services and programs. Though it may be only the
beginning, Sarah’s case and the scrutiny of the OPTN under-12 rule
serve as an example of how the federal government and the Court
should approach the review of agency actions and policies when the
agency itself is administered by a private, non-government actor.
Delegation of congressional power to private agencies can be an
effective and efficient tool for the administration of traditional
government functions, especially in highly technical areas such as
organ transplantation. Despite their effectiveness, these actors fall
outside the constitutional framework, and there must be a solution for
how those who are in the most dire need—those who are dying as
they wait for an organ transplant—to fight possibly arbitrary agency
policies created by these private, non-government actors. In order to
face the likely challenges ahead, a system that incorporates judicial
review and internal agency review should be adopted in order to keep
private actors who have been delegated government power accountable to those who use their services. This solution offers a timely
remedy for those who are in the greatest need of a change to the
policy but at the same time allows the agency to create a more
effective and lasting solution that will apply equally to all Americans.
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